This article argues that there was considerable divergence among infantry units during the early years of Operation Banner (1969Banner ( -1976. The Army struggled to adapt to soldiering in the UK -the British government quickly made clear that colonial measures were unsuitable in a domestic context. Some units accepted this new logic; others engaged in deviancy, determined to punish the local population from which the IRA drew its support. The Army's senior leadership failed to prevent such divergence.
would later try to draw a direct continuum between operations in Aden and Northern Ireland, part of a concerted attempt to portray Operation Banner -the Army's campaign in Ulster -as simply another rear-guard, punitive, and very 'colonial' war. The Army, Adams argued, was irredeemably anti-Irish, sectarian (at least in the case of Scottish soldiers) and colonial in its mind-set. 4 This article will make four key arguments: first, it contends that state violence in Northern Ireland was much less than that experienced in the colonies; when colonial counterinsurgent tactics such as curfews or internment without trial were introduced, they generally proved damaging to London's political aims and were quickly rescinded. 1971. 7 There was a persistent trend of informal punishment of areas by small infantry units without the express sanction, or censure, of senior commanders.
Fourth, the war in Northern Ireland created an imperative for soldiers to establish an emotional separation from the local population. Soldiers often found it more difficult to take the lives of people in what appeared to be a familiar environment, similar to the rest of the UK. A separation of identity became necessary: if the soldier is to do violence, it is better that it is not to his own people. Viewed through this prism, the demonization of the local Irish population is not only due to a resentment of casualties inflicted by the IRA, but is simultaneously also a way for the soldier to justify actions that he would not want to inflict on his own people or community. Pre-existing cultural differences between English or Scottish soldiers and the local Irish population were far less important factors in explaining anti-Irish rhetoric among soldiers than the urgent need to create separation so that distasteful, otherwise morally questionable, tasks can be carried out. Army believed that such action was long overdue. 25 But Whitelaw, the consummate political operator, understood that timing is everything.
Uncertain Ground: Adapting to Counterinsurgency in the UK

Operation Motorman
Operation The GOC said that the Army was suffering casualties, which compared unfavourably with other internal security operations such as those in Borneo and
Kenya, but without the special processes of law which had enabled effective action to be taken against terrorists in those theatres. Accurate sniper fire was particularly worrying as his troops felt that they were presenting sitting targets without the will on the part of the authorities to retaliate against the known enemy. 30 Tuzo Belfast. 49 The Argylls in turn generally had a very low opinion of Loyalist paramilitary groups -especially their mimicry of military organisation. 50 
Players, Gentlemen and Crap-Hats
Some soldiers divided infantry Regiments into 'Players' and 'Crap-hats'. 'Players' were aggressive Regiments who were willing to bend, or even break, the rules in order to get the job done -and these were often the Regiments who traditionally had most combat experience during the colonial counterinsurgency era (For example Highland Regiments, the Royal Green Jackets, the Parachute Regiment). Or as Brigadier Joe 
Giving Some Back: Revenge as a Critical Motivation
Soldiers, particularly junior officers from more sheltered privileged backgrounds, recoiled from the poverty they encountered in Northern Ireland. 62 Initial shock and even sympathy at the conditions in which some Catholics lived in in Northern Ireland gave way to contempt on the part of some units as they suffered increasing casualties on operations in 1971 and 1972. The constant verbal abuse of soldiers took its toll -any perceived weakness (physical appearance, a stutter etc.) would be exploited. One black soldier was called 'Banana muncher' by the Derry IRA newspaper and advised to 'find a tree to hide in'. 63 In response, some soldiers began to demonize the Catholic poor as inherently 'dirty' or savage -indirectly emphasising a moral or social distance between themselves and the local inhabitants. 64 Locals were either helping the IRA, or knew who they were, but did nothing to prevent soldiers being Unchecked, he went on to stuff bolts into a gun and fire them at people, including a local man working at a petrol station. He was also later involved in the murders of Michael Naan and Andrew Murray in Fermanagh. One of the main problems of changing patrolling policy is the bitterness that exists. As you said the people have no confidence in the army after four years, but our soldiers are equally bitter after several years of stoning, shootings, and constant rebuffs, and it will be a hard task to convince and inspire them to put into practice on the ground a policy which we at command level agree is correct… 73 Bishop Daly was convinced that the Grenadier Guards were meting out collective, retributive punishment to the general population in Derry and he wrote an angry letter to the GOC, Lieutenant-General Frank King. Other Army units had behaved well prior to the Grenadier Guards arrival; support for the IRA had diminished due to the different approach of other, more restrained units and community leaders. Now months of work was being undone in a few days, or, as he put it to Major Lockhart: 'Your men are antagonizing a whole population, and you are playing right into the hands of the Provos.' 74 In a written response to Daly, General King could not conceal his contempt for the Creggan area -the inhabitants were to blame: they knew who the gunmen were and could have thrown them out. 75 Inexcusable behaviour was excused on the basis that the victims were somehow at fault, a tendency that has been highlighted by Sibylle Scheipers in her work on irregular warfare. 76 An example of reflexive defensiveness and denial was the attitude of the With both RMP and RUC sympathetic towards the soldier, who after all was doing an incredibly difficult job, he was highly unlikely to make a statement incriminating himself, for the RMP investigator was out for information for managerial 83 , not criminal purposes, and, using their powers of discretion, it was equally unlikely that the RUC would prefer charges against soldiers except in this most extreme of circumstances. 84 At the end of 1972 Sir Barry Shaw, the newly appointed Director of Public Prosecutions, effectively revoked RUC discretionary powers, insisting that all allegations against the Army to be passed to him for examination. 85 By January 1975, the Ministry of Defence had made out of court settlements in 410 cases of alleged abuse, out of an approximate total of 6,000 claims. 86 And, under scrutiny from Shaw, the RMP SIB were forced to conduct more thorough, 'normal SIB standard' inquiries into allegations of excessive force by soldiers.
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Conclusion
The preceding article has arrived at four main conclusions: first, attempts to introduce colonial measures -internment, interrogation-in-depth, curfews -proved to be politically disastrous within a UK context. In 1972 senior Army officers in Northern
Ireland resented SSNI's refusal to use colonial-type tools to respond to escalating violence in Northern Ireland. 88 Whitelaw realised that a military response to IRA violence was not the primary means of victory but it was the main way to lose if implemented incorrectly. Using colonial measures in the UK was neither politically desirable nor legally acceptable: in the short-term Whitelaw preferred to err on the side of exposing the Army to more danger, rather than continuing the politically damaging policy of internment without trial -which had fuelled a rise in support for the IRA.
More rigorous investigations into allegations of abuse after 1972 appear to have corresponded with a shift in soldiers' behaviour; operations and arrests were more selective, interrogations less brutal, intelligence began to improve. 89 Revulsion at IRA tactics and errors -such as Bloody Friday and the death of six local men in the Newry Customs bombing of 9 August 1972 -meant that the tide of Catholic public opinion turned against the IRA. 90 The daily average of shooting incidents showed a drop from 92 in July 1972 to just nine 12 months later. 91 Second, the Army' senior leadership during the early years of Operation Banner could display a disbelieving, even callous attitude to allegations of abuse. HQNI's own attitudes, mirrored at an operational level, were not conducive to good discipline -as soldiers came to regard whole areas through a prism of complicity in the deaths of soldiers. Almost nobody was presumed innocent in the Creggan or the Bogside.
Although soldiers were not permitted to engage in official reprisals as on previous colonial campaigns, they could informally punish an area -whether by destroying a house or harassing the inhabitants. A very few went even further -killing unarmed local civilians. Even then, with respect to Bloody Sunday or in the case of Majella O' Hare, HQNI failed to fully investigate the crimes that had been committed.
Third, if unchecked by their officers and NCOs, operations in the Bogside or
Crossmaglen could quickly descend into very local confrontations between groups of young men, eager to provoke, escalate and react. Participation in violence was highly desirable, if not status defining. 92 As in gangs, combat is an initiation for 'real soldiers'.
New soldiers were fascinated by 'mythic violence' -'the legends and stories shared by gang members about their participation in violence'. 93 The temptation for cohesive, small units of soldiers -fuelled on a hyper-masculine, aggressive self-image -to challenge rival groups is obvious. The fundamental distinction between gangs and the military is that the military adheres to, and should act on behalf of, the law. Without such restraint and punishment, 'Player' or hyper-invested units -'unit pride … so exaggerated that one only respects the members of one's unit' -can come to resemble gangs, out for retribution using methods that go against the standards of the wider institution and state they are supposed to serve. 94 In the case of the stabbing to death of Michael Naan and Andrew Murray by NCOs from D Company, 1 Argylls, the identity of the perpetrators was only discovered because an ex-Argyll soldier tipped off police almost six years later, concerned that one of the same NCOs was the 'Yorkshire Ripper' -the Argylls were based in the north of England at the time. The soldier did not want
Northern Ireland deeds to be replicated at home in Britain (Interestingly he did not appear to be concerned that they could be repeated by the same soldiers in later Operation Banner tours). 95 In Northern Ireland Battalions and sub-units had considerable autonomy to shift the tempo of operations as they saw fit -leading to contradictory approaches on part of rotating units. 'Player' units that had seen a lot of recent active service in the coloniessuch as the Parachute Regiment, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (both of whom served in Aden in 1967) -struggled to adapt to soldiering in a UK environment, to escape the myths and moulding experiences of their previous operations.
Fourth, soldiers' use of anti-Irish sentiment and, more rarely, sectarian language was a means of retaliation to physical attack and abuse; such abuse was also symptomatic of a perceived need to create some moral distance between soldiers and the local population.
Anti-Irish sentiment was indulged in at all levels -and, at least to some degree, mirrored sentiments occasionally heard at home in Britain. But rather than exhibiting entrenched sectarian or anti-Irish attitudes before deployment, soldiers were surprised and very often appalled by the scale of sectarian hatred and violence they encountered in Northern Ireland. Creating a moral distance between them and the local population was partly utilitarian -a soldier does not want to take the life of 'kith and kin', better 'an other'; it took time for soldiers to adjust to the occasional need of taking lives 'between a WH Smith and a Marks and Spencer'. However, in such an intensely social war, officers struggled to contain and channel their soldiers desire for revenge.
